本報(bào)告旨在評(píng)估中國(guó)政府在補(bǔ)貼方面運(yùn)營(yíng)和投資燃煤發(fā)電機(jī)組的成本，燃煤發(fā)電機(jī)組是中國(guó)主要的電力來(lái)源。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，2014年和2015年，燃煤發(fā)電補(bǔ)貼金額分別至少為2520億元人民幣（377億美元）和1200億元人民幣（180億美元）。盡管由于方法上的差異，直接的比較很復(fù)雜，但中國(guó)政府對(duì)燃煤發(fā)電的支持，包括該行業(yè)的所謂“僵尸公司”，似乎是提供給可再生能源的補(bǔ)貼水平的大約兩倍：按每年450億至1030億（67億美元至154億美元）的順序。 盡管政府對(duì)中國(guó)燃煤發(fā)電的支持是相當(dāng)大的，但根據(jù)20國(guó)集團(tuán)“逐步取消低效化石燃料補(bǔ)貼”的承諾（20國(guó)集團(tuán)，2009年），它沒有被選為中國(guó)在2016年與美國(guó)（20國(guó)集團(tuán)，2016年）共同接受并公布的化石燃料補(bǔ)貼自愿同行審查的一部分。除了對(duì)煤炭發(fā)電商的補(bǔ)貼外，國(guó)際可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所（IISD）全球補(bǔ)貼倡議（GSI）此前還發(fā)表了一份研究報(bào)告，對(duì)主要在采掘業(yè)的供應(yīng)方活動(dòng)的補(bǔ)貼進(jìn)行了審查（Denjean、Gerasimchuk、Bossong和Pickard，2015；Xue、Wang、Bridle、Gerasimchuk和Attwood，2015）。 圖ES1將本報(bào)告中的新補(bǔ)貼估算與中國(guó)其他能源補(bǔ)貼估算（包括20國(guó)集團(tuán)同行評(píng)議）相比較。鑒于對(duì)燃煤發(fā)電的補(bǔ)貼規(guī)模之大，很明顯，這些補(bǔ)貼應(yīng)該成為政策制定者和利益相關(guān)者關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)，以便向低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)和自由流速度改革過(guò)渡。 本報(bào)告適用世界貿(mào)易組織在《補(bǔ)貼和反補(bǔ)貼措施協(xié)定》中對(duì)補(bǔ)貼的定義。這一補(bǔ)貼定義的范圍與經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織使用的范圍相同，不包括氣候影響和污染方面的環(huán)境成本。
This report seeks to assess the cost to the Chinese government, in terms of subsidies, of operating and investing in coal-fired electricity generators, the predominant source of electricity in China. We find that the value of the subsidies to coal-fired generation was at least CNY 252 billion (USD 37.7 billion) in 2014 and CNY 120 billion (USD 18 billion) in 2015. Though straightforward comparisons are complicated due to differences in methodologies, China’s government support of coal-fired generation, including the so-called “zombie companies” in the sector, appears to be about approximately double the level of subsidies provided to renewables: in the order of CNY 45 billion to 103 billion (USD 6.7 billion to 15.4 billion) per year. Even though government support to coal-fired generation in China is sizable, it was not selected as part of the voluntary peer review of fossil fuel subsidies (FSS) that China underwent and published in 2016, jointly with the United States (G20, 2016) under the G20 commitment to “phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies” (G20, 2009). Beyond subsidies to coal generators, the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD) Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) has previously published research examining subsidies to supply-side activities, mainly in the extractive sector (Denjean, Gerasimchuk, Bossong, & Pickard, 2015; Xue, Wang, Bridle, Gerasimchuk, & Attwood, 2015). Figure ES1 contextualizes the new estimates of subsidies from this report compared to other energy subsidy estimates in China, including in the G20 peer review. Given the sheer scale of subsidies to coal-fired generation, it is clear that they should be made the focal point of policy-makers and stakeholders interested in transition to a low-carbon economy and FFS reform. This report applies the definition of subsidies provided by the World Trade Organization in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The scope of this subsidy definition is the same as used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and does not include environmental costs in terms of climate impacts and pollution.
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