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持續(xù)低油價對伊朗的影響IMPLICATIONS OF SUSTAINED LOW OIL PRICES ON IRAN

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更新時間：2021-09-17
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與許多其他主要石油出口國不同，2014年年中以來油價下跌對伊朗經(jīng)濟影響不大，至少與針對德黑蘭的國際制裁制度相比。三年前對伊朗實施的制裁制度對伊朗經(jīng)濟造成了類似于現(xiàn)在其他產(chǎn)油國所面臨的那種巨大沖擊。因此，對伊朗來說，油價下跌是第二個次要的問題，就其所有影響而言，對伊朗經(jīng)濟而言，與其說是制裁，不如說是一個根本問題。自2013年2月以來，伊朗從石油銷售中獲得的收入有限，實際上就像是大幅降價。在美國的制裁下，在中國、印度、日本、韓國、臺灣和土耳其持有伊朗石油收入的銀行，除了支持雙邊貿(mào)易或購買人道主義物資外，都阻止了這些收入的使用或轉移。通過五常加一（中國、法國、德國、俄羅斯、英國和美國）和伊朗的聯(lián)合行動計劃（JPOA），這種情況并沒有得到改善，根據(jù)該計劃，伊朗每月只能從國外獲得7億美元的石油收入。伊朗的進口已經(jīng)轉向有利于其剩余的石油客戶，但仍然沒有達到伊朗通過向他們出售石油所賺取的金額。其結果是，這6家客戶銀行的受限賬戶收入不斷增加，而且伊朗必須做出計劃，仿佛這些收入基本上無法獲得。針對這一第一次根本性沖擊，伊朗已經(jīng)開始采取適當?shù)恼邞獙Υ胧?。首先，伊朗人?013年6月選舉哈桑魯哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）為總統(tǒng)，部分原因是他在競選中承諾要整頓伊朗經(jīng)濟船。在哈塔米總統(tǒng)（1997年至2005年）的領導下，一小群技術官僚終于在德黑蘭重新掌權，帶來了更加理性的經(jīng)濟方針和政策。這包括但不限于努力改變伊朗使用國家收入的方式，減少伊朗對石油收入的依賴，并解決與政府有關的腐敗問題。鑒于上一屆政府的管理得到了極大改善，魯哈尼政府在通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟增長方面的數(shù)據(jù)不斷提高，盡管創(chuàng)造就業(yè)和減少失業(yè)仍然是更難克服的障礙。作者總結說，魯哈尼總統(tǒng)對伊朗經(jīng)濟的長期計劃取決于取消制裁。伊朗可以從多樣化中獲益，擺脫對石油出口收入的依賴，但制裁也限制了伊朗獲得必要支持和物資的能力，以建立可行的非石油出口部門。如果制裁措施繼續(xù)實施，伊朗可以從油價上漲和改變國內(nèi)燃料補貼方式，允許政府從國內(nèi)消費中獲取收入中獲益。但如果不解除制裁，伊朗將無法實現(xiàn)增加就業(yè)、進一步降低通脹、使該國整體增長軌跡更接近潛力的目標。制裁只會造成太多問題，削弱伊朗為應對更廣泛的經(jīng)濟挑戰(zhàn)而進行政策調(diào)整的能力。

Unlike many other major petroleum exporting countries, the drop in oil prices since mid-2014 has affected the Iranian economy modestly, at least in comparison to the international sanctions regime in place against Tehran. The sanctions regime imposed against Iran three years ago created the sort of massive shock for the Iranian economy that is being faced now by other oil-producing states. The oil price drop was, therefore, a second, lesser issue for Iran that—for all of its effects—is less of a fundamental problem for the Iranian economy than the sanctions imposed against it. Iran’s limited access to the revenue from its oil sales since February 2013 acted, in effect, like a major price reduction. Under US sanctions, banks holding Iran’s oil revenues in China, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey have prevented these revenues from being used or transferred, other than in support of bilateral trade or for the purchase of humanitarian goods. This situation has not improved through P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran’s Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), under which Iran only has access to $700 million of its oil revenues held abroad per month. Iran’s imports have shifted to favor its remaining oil customers but still has not equaled the amount of money that Iran has earned through oil sales to them. The result has been an accretion of revenues in restricted accounts in those six customers’ banks and a requirement for Iran to plan as if these revenues are largely inaccessible. In response to this first fundamental shock, Iran has already begun undertaking the appropriate policy response. First, Iranians elected Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in June 2013, in part in response to his campaign promises to right the Iranian economic ship. Through his election, a coterie of technocrats—last in office under President Khatami (1997–2005)—has returned to power in Tehran, bringing with them a more rational economic approach and policies. This has included but is not limited to efforts to change the manner in which Iran spends national revenue, reduce Iran’s dependence on the availability of oil revenues, and address problems of government-related corruption. Given vastly improved management over the last administration, Rouhani’s government is consistently posting better numbers regarding inflation and economic growth, although job creation and unemployment reduction remain more difficult hurdles to overcome. The authors conclude that President Rouhani’s longterm plans for Iran’s economy, however, hinge on sanctions being removed. Iran could benefit from diversifying away from dependence on oil for export revenue, but sanctions have also limited Iran’s ability to obtain support and materiel necessary to create viable, nonoil export sectors. If sanctions were to remain in place, Iran could benefit from higher oil prices and from changing its approach to domestic fuel subsidies to permit the government to collect revenues from internal consumption. But without sanctions relief, Iran will not be able to achieve its goals of increasing employment and bringing inflation down further and bringing the country’s overall growth trajectory closer to its potential. Sanctions simply create too many problems and impair Iran’s ability to undertake policy adjustments to address its broader economic challenges.

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