資料簡介
各國政府每年都會花費(fèi)大量資源補(bǔ)貼能源產(chǎn)品的消費(fèi)，產(chǎn)生許多不正當(dāng)?shù)挠绊?。用于補(bǔ)貼的資源將公共預(yù)算從教育和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資等其他用途轉(zhuǎn)移開。能源消費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼，雖然往往是為了造福窮人，但通常是倒退的，因?yàn)榇蟛糠值母＠怯赡切┫M(fèi)水平最高、收入分配最高的人獲得的。補(bǔ)貼計劃也扭曲了能源市場，鼓勵過度消費(fèi)，同時將需求轉(zhuǎn)向補(bǔ)貼產(chǎn)品，并遠(yuǎn)離那些定價更能反映實(shí)際市場狀況的產(chǎn)品。這些問題是眾所周知的，但總的補(bǔ)貼水平仍然很高。2013年，消費(fèi)者和生產(chǎn)者補(bǔ)貼估計占全球國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值（GDP）的0.7%（Coady等人。2015年）。這是因?yàn)?，盡管補(bǔ)貼扭曲了政府和能源市場的職能，但它們在政治上往往非常受歡迎。面向消費(fèi)者的補(bǔ)貼通常以穩(wěn)定價格政策開始，通常以價格管制的形式進(jìn)行，全世界有組織的消費(fèi)者團(tuán)體已經(jīng)可信地證明，當(dāng)基本產(chǎn)品的價格上升到不可接受的水平時，他們甚至?xí)訂T到暴亂的地步。以高尚、目標(biāo)明確、確保價格穩(wěn)定為出發(fā)點(diǎn)的小額補(bǔ)貼可能會變得根深蒂固。補(bǔ)貼的存在吸引了支持性的利益集團(tuán)，他們在政治上動員起來，要求更大、更持久的補(bǔ)貼 補(bǔ)貼。因此，取消或重新定向補(bǔ)貼變得更加困難。事實(shí)上，能源補(bǔ)貼的問題并不是專家們對其反常影響的認(rèn)識之一。相反，這是一個政治經(jīng)濟(jì)問題。本研究探討能源補(bǔ)貼改革的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。多年來，特別是在本世紀(jì)能源價格居高不下的情況下，這個話題一直是許多政治議程的核心。2009年，20國集團(tuán)（G 20）發(fā)達(dá)和新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體呼吁所有國家逐步取消低效的化石燃料補(bǔ)貼，2012年g20重申了這一點(diǎn)（IMF 2013b）。
Every year governments spend vast sums of resources subsidizing the consumption of energy products, with many perverse effects. The resources spent on subsidies divert public budgets from other purposes such as investments in education and infrastructure. Energy consumption subsidies, although often intended to benefit the poor, are typically regressive as the bulk of the benefits accrue to those with the highest levels of consumption—those at the top of the income distribution. Subsidy programs also distort energy markets by encouraging excessive consumption overall while shifting demand toward subsidized products and away from those products whose pricing better reflects real market conditions. These problems are widely known, yet the total level of subsidy remains high. Consumer and producer subsidies were estimated at 0.7 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 (Coady et al. 2015). That’s because subsidies, for all their distortions to the function of government and energy markets, are often extremely popular politically. Consumer-facing subsidies usually begin as a price stabilization policy, typically in the form of price controls, and organized consumer groups around the world have credibly demonstrated they will mobilize—even to the point of riot—when the price of essential products rises to unacceptable levels. Subsidies that begin small with noble, well-focused purposes to ensure price stability can become entrenched. The presence of a subsidy attracts supportive interest groups that mobilize politically to press for larger, more permanent subsidies. As a result, removal or redirection of the subsidy becomes harder. Indeed, the problem of energy subsidies isn’t one of expert knowledge about their perverse effects. It is, rather, a problem of political economy. This study explores the political economy of energy subsidy reform. For years, especially in the 2000s when energy prices have been high, this topic has been central to many political agendas. In 2009, the Group of 20 (G-20) advanced and emerging market economies called for a phaseout of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in all countries, and the G-20 reaffirmed this in 2012 (IMF 2013b). The experience with reform is highly varied. Currently as many as 27 countries are already reforming fossil fuel subsidies. In addition to subsidy reform, 40 countries and over 20 subnational jurisdictions now apply or have scheduled the introduction of a carbon price, and another 26 are actively considering one (Klevns, Stern, and Frejova 2015). Despite many failures at reform, there have also been striking successes. All told, subsidies today are US$117 billion per year lower than they would have been without recent reforms (IEA 2015). Indeed, a study on the political economy of energy subsidy reform is particularly relevant today because the steep decline in most energy commodity prices over the past two years has created an opportunity for reformers (CFR 2015; Klevns, Stern, and Frejova 2015). Lower prices for crude oil and products have meant that the subsidy needed to sustain retail price controls is much smaller. Indeed, in some countries, the continuation of price controls set in the era of high global prices means that, in effect, schemes that used to create subsidies are now raising the local cost of energy products relative to global markets.1 For commodity exporting countries in particular, low prices have created massive fiscal pressure on governments, which in turn has created urgent needs for reform. In short, many political leaders have seized these reform opportunities. What should be learned from their experiences? And how can reformers remove and reframe subsidies in ways that are politically durable—so that the problem of subsidies does not reappear when world market prices rise again? Relatively few World Bank reports provide a political economy perspective on energy subsidy reform. Most of the work by Bank teams on subsidies has focused on the sectoral efficiency, fiscal sustainability, optimal policy design, or distributional impacts of subsidies. For example, a recent internal stocktaking of analytical reports on energy subsidies by Bank teams over the past 10 years found that only a quarter of them undertake some analysis of the political economy of reforms. It is widely known that political economy is central to energy subsidy reform—a point made in an array of diverse studies (Beaton et al. 2013; Victor 2009). Yet, to date, most of the literature on energy subsidies has not engaged with political economy needs in a structured, detailed manner.
資料截圖
版權(quán)：如無特殊注明，文章轉(zhuǎn)載自網(wǎng)絡(luò)，侵權(quán)請聯(lián)系cnmhg168#163.com刪除！文件均為網(wǎng)友上傳，僅供研究和學(xué)習(xí)使用，務(wù)必24小時內(nèi)刪除。
熱門推薦
-
石油化工自動控制設(shè)計手冊（第四版） 黃步余 化工出版社 2020年 2021-09-20
-
工業(yè)除塵設(shè)備設(shè)計手冊 張殿印 申麗 化工出版社 2012年 2021-09-20
-
加拿大煤炭開采Coal Mining in Canada 2021-09-20
-
化工節(jié)能技術(shù)手冊 王文堂 2006年化學(xué)工業(yè)出版社 2021-09-20
-
年終總結(jié)新年計劃工作匯報PPT模板 2021-09-20