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朝鮮核武器: 技術(shù)問(wèn)題North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:  Technical Issues 朝鮮核武器: 技術(shù)問(wèn)題North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:  Technical Issues

朝鮮核武器: 技術(shù)問(wèn)題North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

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這份報(bào)告總結(jié)了從公開(kāi)來(lái)源了解的關(guān)于朝鮮核問(wèn)題的情況。 武器計(jì)劃-包括武器用裂變材料和彈頭估計(jì)-以及 評(píng)估實(shí)現(xiàn)無(wú)核化的當(dāng)前發(fā)展。很少詳細(xì)的開(kāi)源 有關(guān)朝鮮核武器生產(chǎn)能力、彈頭的信息可以獲得 鈾濃縮項(xiàng)目的復(fù)雜程度、范圍和成功程度 增殖活性。據(jù)估計(jì),朝鮮的總重量在30至50公斤之間。 分離钚,足夠制造至少六枚核武器。而朝鮮 武器項(xiàng)目從一開(kāi)始就以钚為基礎(chǔ),在過(guò)去的十年里,情報(bào)部門(mén)一直在進(jìn)行這項(xiàng)工作。 出現(xiàn)并指出使用高濃縮鈾制造炸彈的第二條路線。北韓 2009年,中國(guó)公開(kāi)承認(rèn)了一項(xiàng)鈾濃縮計(jì)劃,但曾表示,其目標(biāo)是 生產(chǎn)用于核能的燃料。2010年11月,朝鮮展示了訪問(wèn)美國(guó)的情景。 100MWT輕水反應(yīng)堆和新建氣體離心機(jī)的早期建造 鈾濃縮工廠,都在寧邊工地。朝鮮人要求進(jìn)行濃縮。 工廠已投入運(yùn)行,但尚未得到獨(dú)立確認(rèn)。美國(guó)官員說(shuō), 可能還有其他的秘密濃縮設(shè)施。從2002年底開(kāi)始,朝鮮 終止了為期8年的钚生產(chǎn)凍結(jié)計(jì)劃,并被驅(qū)逐出境。 檢查員和重新啟動(dòng)設(shè)施。2005年9月,六方會(huì)談成員(聯(lián)合) 美國(guó)、韓國(guó)、日本、中國(guó)、俄羅斯和北韓)發(fā)表了一項(xiàng)聯(lián)合聲明 可核查的朝鮮半島無(wú)核化。2006年10月9日,北韓進(jìn)行了軍事演習(xí)。 核試驗(yàn),產(chǎn)量小于1千噸。2007年2月,朝鮮和其他國(guó)家 六方會(huì)談成員商定了分階段實(shí)施2005年協(xié)議的步驟 無(wú)核化協(xié)議。第一階段包括在 寧邊核設(shè)施以換取向朝鮮運(yùn)送第一批重燃料油。 第二階段包括停用寧邊钚生產(chǎn)設(shè)施和 “完整無(wú)誤”申報(bào)朝鮮核活動(dòng),以換取 能源援助和美國(guó)取消某些制裁。這份聲明是在6月份提交的。 2008。此后,布什總統(tǒng)將朝鮮從《與敵方貿(mào)易法》中除名。 (TWEA)列出并通知國(guó)會(huì),他打算解除支持恐怖主義國(guó)家的資格(SST) 在北韓同意核實(shí)條款后指定。北韓沒(méi)有接受初步協(xié)議。 美國(guó)的核查提議,以及2008年9月,威脅要重新開(kāi)始處理钚。 2008年10月,美國(guó)官員宣布就核查問(wèn)題達(dá)成口頭雙邊協(xié)議。 布什政府將朝鮮從SST名單上除名。朝鮮不久后就這么說(shuō)了 沒(méi)有同意在核地點(diǎn)取樣,這是核實(shí)钚的關(guān)鍵因素 生產(chǎn)。自2008年12月以來(lái),六方會(huì)談一直沒(méi)有召開(kāi)。

This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. While North Korea’s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the last decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist.Beginning in late 2002, North Korea ended an eight-year freeze on its plutonium production program, expelled international inspectors, and restarted facilities. In September 2005, members of the Six-Party Talks (United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea) issued a Joint Statement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of less than 1 kiloton. In February 2007, North Korea and the other members of the Six-Party Talks agreed on steps for phased implementation of the 2005 denuclearization agreement. Phase 1 included the shut-down of plutonium production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for an initial heavy fuel oil shipment to North Korea. Phase 2 steps included disablement of plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon and a “complete and correct” declaration of DPRK nuclear activities, in exchange for delivery of energy assistance and removal of certain U.S. sanctions. The declaration was submitted in June 2008. Thereafter, President Bush removed North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) list and notified Congress of his intent to lift the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation after North Korea agreed to verification provisions. North Korea did not accept initial U.S. verification proposals, and in September 2008, threatened to restart reprocessing plutonium. U.S. officials announced a verbal bilateral agreement on verification in October 2008, and the Bush administration removed North Korea from the SST List. North Korea soon after said that it had not agreed to sampling at nuclear sites, a key element for verification of plutonium production. The Six-Party Talks have not convened since December 2008.

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