首頁 > 資料下載 > 利比亞：解除制裁做得對嗎？1980-2006年利比亞制裁經(jīng)驗回顧LIBYA: SANCTIONS REMOVAL DONE RIGHT? A REVIEW OF THE LIBYAN SANCTION

利比亞：解除制裁做得對嗎？1980-2006年利比亞制裁經(jīng)驗回顧LIBYA: SANCTIONS REMOVAL DONE RIGHT? A REVIEW OF THE LIBYAN SANCTION

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更新時間：2021-09-20
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利比亞2003年決定放棄大規(guī)模殺傷性武器（WMD）計劃并支持恐怖主義，與此相關(guān)的外交被正確地當(dāng)作一種模式。經(jīng)過多年的孤立和國際制裁，利比亞獨裁者卡扎菲決定改變路線。他同意拆除并遣返大部分核設(shè)施，銷毀化學(xué)武器庫存和彈道導(dǎo)彈，并放棄將恐怖主義作為外交政策工具。利比亞希望基本實現(xiàn)正常化，并準(zhǔn)備為此付出代價，但也希望獲得這種正?；暮锰?。在這方面，利比亞不僅是如何實施制裁，而且是如何解除制裁的一個有益的試驗案例。盡管作為制裁故事的一部分常常被忽視，但一旦實施制裁，對制裁的救濟與實施制裁的方式一樣重要。這是因為制裁不僅僅是剝奪資源或與對手接觸；制裁還旨在為其他潛在制裁目標(biāo)提供客觀教訓(xùn)。因此，重要的是，制裁的實施應(yīng)被視為具有侵略性和徹底性，而且制裁的減免也應(yīng)被視為對那些有朝一日可能發(fā)現(xiàn)自己處于未來制裁努力的接受端的國家切實有效。如果制裁是為了達到外交杠桿的目的，對不當(dāng)行為造成后果，那么受制裁者也必須能夠向國內(nèi)外聽眾表明，救濟是有好處的。根據(jù)對數(shù)據(jù)和軼事歷史的回顧，似乎有足夠的理由支持這樣一種觀點，即制裁對利比亞經(jīng)濟（最終對其決策者）產(chǎn)生影響，制裁也被取消。關(guān)于這一結(jié)論，數(shù)據(jù)和歷史記錄不一致。畢竟，盡管利比亞的經(jīng)濟增長逐漸放緩，但并沒有像通常所預(yù)期的那樣，全面的經(jīng)濟制裁也沒有見底。同樣，盡管2004年后利比亞經(jīng)濟確實增長了，投資也增加了，但利比亞石油出口也同時增加，這也挫傷了人們對制裁解除效果的熱情。此外，考慮到考慮的時間跨度，在伊拉克對利比亞戰(zhàn)略思維施加沉重壓力后，卡扎菲擔(dān)心9/11事件后利比亞可能成為繼阿富汗之后的下一個窩藏恐怖分子的國家或擁有一個新的大規(guī)模殺傷性武器計劃等其他問題也可能成為類似的入侵原因。但制裁確實對利比亞的決策和改善經(jīng)濟的能力起到了制約作用。此外，歸根結(jié)底，利比亞官員自己肯定的解除對利比亞制裁的愿望，是當(dāng)時利比亞戰(zhàn)略計謀的一部分，這導(dǎo)致利比亞官員和卡扎菲親自改變利比亞政策，在大規(guī)模殺傷性武器擴散和恐怖主義方面有利于國際利益。對于未來的救濟情況，有兩項建議是如何最好地評估制裁救濟的績效。

The diplomacy associated with Libya’s 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and support for terrorism has been rightly held up as a model. After years of isolation and international sanctions, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi decided to change course. He agreed to dismantle and repatriate most of his nuclear infrastructure, to eliminate his chemical weapon stocks and ballistic missiles, and to abandon the use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Libya wanted to be largely normalized and was prepared to pay a price to achieve this end but also wanted to receive the benefits of this normalization. In this, Libya represents a useful test case for not only how sanctions can be imposed but also for how they can be relieved. Though often ignored as a component of the sanctions story, relief from sanctions once imposed is as important as the manner of their imposition. This is because sanctions are not just about denial of resources or access to an adversary; they are also intended to serve as an object lesson for other potential sanctions targets. For this reason, it is important that sanctions imposition is seen as aggressive and thorough but also that sanctions relief is seen as tangible and useful to those that may—one day—find themselves on the receiving end of a future sanctions effort. If sanctions are to serve their purpose for diplomatic leverage by inflicting consequences for misbehavior, then those who are made subject to them must also be able to articulate to audiences both at home and abroad that relief has its benefits. Based on a review of the data and anecdotal history, there appears to be sufficient grounds to support the contention that sanctions had an effect on Libya’s economy (and eventually on its decision-makers), as well as did their removal. There are inconsistencies in the data and historical record with respect to this conclusion. After all, though Libyan economic growth petered out, it did not bottom out as wide-ranging economic sanctions would normally intend. Likewise, though the Libyan economy did grow and investment increased after 2004, the fact that Libyan oil exports also increased at the same time dampens the enthusiastic case for the effects of sanctions relief. Moreover, considering the arc of time under consideration, it is possible that other issues—such as Gaddafi’s fear after 9/11 that Libya might be next after Afghanistan for harboring terrorists or that possession of a nascent WMD program would be similar cause for invasion after Iraq—weighed heavily in Libyan strategic thinking. But sanctions did play a role in constraining the decision-making of Libya and its ability to improve its economy. Moreover, in the end, a desire to rid Libya of sanctions—which Libyan officials have themselves affirmed was part of the Libyan strategic calculus at the time—led Libyan officials and Gaddafi personally to make changes to Libyan policy in a manner that was conducive to international interests with respect to WMD proliferation and terrorism. For future relief scenarios, there are two recommendations for how best to evaluate sanctions relief performance.

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