自1990年代后期以來(lái)，一些州已經(jīng)對(duì)其電力公用事業(yè)進(jìn)行了重組，以引入零售競(jìng)爭(zhēng)提供發(fā)電服務(wù)。這包括從弗吉尼亞州到緬因州的東北部幾乎所有州，以及加利福尼亞州，德克薩斯州，俄亥俄州和伊利諾伊州。1其他州也正在審查零售競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，但尚未實(shí)施或未完全批準(zhǔn)。此外，由于聯(lián)邦能源監(jiān)管委員會(huì)（FERC）的輸電開(kāi)放訪問(wèn)和市場(chǎng)定價(jià)授權(quán)命令，批發(fā)電力市場(chǎng)在很大程度上被放松管制。 加州重組后的電力市場(chǎng)崩潰，導(dǎo)致許多消費(fèi)者，電力生產(chǎn)商和政策制定者質(zhì)疑將競(jìng)爭(zhēng)引入零售電力市場(chǎng)的智慧。包括俄克拉荷馬州，新墨西哥州和北卡羅來(lái)納州在內(nèi)的幾個(gè)州已經(jīng)停止實(shí)施或什至考慮采用零售競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的早期計(jì)劃。加利福尼亞州的情況也停止了聯(lián)邦政府在零售層面進(jìn)行全國(guó)性電力重組的努力。 然而，由于服務(wù)成本監(jiān)管不足以激勵(lì)人們提高效率，因此發(fā)電競(jìng)爭(zhēng)仍然是監(jiān)管的替代選擇，因此有可能恢復(fù)大規(guī)模采用電力重組的進(jìn)程。公民，環(huán)保主義者，能源生產(chǎn)者和政策制定者想了解電力市場(chǎng)的更大競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能如何影響電力部門的排放，并最終影響環(huán)境質(zhì)量。 開(kāi)放的輸電通道是否會(huì)增加對(duì)中西部地區(qū)老式，高污染燃煤設(shè)施的使用，從而增加排放量？此類排放物的遠(yuǎn)距離運(yùn)輸是否會(huì)損害東部各州遵守《清潔空氣法》的臭氧標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的能力？促進(jìn)需求方管理和可再生能源利用的實(shí)用程序?qū)⒆兂墒裁礃?？如果重組能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)承諾的較低電價(jià)，那么需求增加會(huì)導(dǎo)致排放量增加嗎？ 重組可能導(dǎo)致用于發(fā)電的發(fā)電技術(shù)組合，電廠運(yùn)營(yíng)效率以及市場(chǎng)上交易的電力價(jià)格和數(shù)量發(fā)生重大變化，每一項(xiàng)都會(huì)影響排放。 這項(xiàng)研究著眼于重組對(duì)氮氧化物（NOx）和二氧化碳（CO2）的空氣排放的影響。2它探討了替代空氣排放法規(guī)下重組的預(yù)期影響。它并未嘗試衡量迄今為止發(fā)生的行業(yè)重組的影響。截至2001年初，美國(guó)約三分之一的地區(qū)引入了零售渠道，這種部分重組構(gòu)成了我們研究的基準(zhǔn)。我們力求通過(guò)全面零售進(jìn)入全國(guó)范圍的重組，估計(jì)對(duì)空氣排放的影響。 對(duì)于NOx排放，本研究的基準(zhǔn)是夏季，即東北臭氧運(yùn)輸區(qū)（OTR）的總量控制與交易計(jì)劃。該研究將該基線與兩種替代性和更廣泛的NOx監(jiān)管制度進(jìn)行了比較。第一種選擇是將東北O(jiān)TR計(jì)劃擴(kuò)展到更廣闊的地理區(qū)域-美國(guó)東部。第二種選擇是將美國(guó)東部的總量管制和貿(mào)易計(jì)劃從夏季延長(zhǎng)到全年。對(duì)于二氧化碳的排放，研究基準(zhǔn)是當(dāng)今的現(xiàn)行無(wú)法規(guī)政策，另外兩種替代政策是每公噸25美元和每公噸75美元的碳稅。我們進(jìn)行了一系列的大型模擬分析，其中包括三種NOx監(jiān)管情景，以及一個(gè)包含和不包含兩個(gè)碳稅水平的NOx情景。 該研究模擬了2008年電力行業(yè)的運(yùn)行情況。該模型提供了北美電力可靠性委員會(huì)（NERC）的13個(gè)子區(qū)域（請(qǐng)參見(jiàn)圖A的注釋）的地理詳細(xì)信息，并估計(jì)了發(fā)電量（按燃料類型） ，容量組合，電價(jià)和空氣排放。此外，建模還估算了遵守空氣排放控制法規(guī)的成本。

     Since the late 1990s, several states have restructured their electric utilities to introduce retailcompetition for generation service. This includes almost all states in the Northeastfrom Virginia to Maine, plus California, Texas, Ohio, and Illinois.1 Retail competitionhas been under review in other states, but not yet implemented or fully approved. In addition,wholesale electric markets are largely deregulated as a result of the transmission open-accessand market-pricing authority orders from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

     The collapse of California’s restructured electricity market has led many consumers, electricityproducers, and policymakers to question the wisdom of bringing competition to retailelectricity markets. Several states, including Oklahoma, New Mexico, and North Carolina, haveput the brakes on earlier plans to implement or even consider adopting retail competition. Thesituation in California has also halted federal efforts to introduce nationwide electricity restructuringat the retail level.

     Nevertheless, because cost-of-service regulation provides insufficient incentives to improveefficiency, competition in electricity generation remains an attractive alternative to regulation.Progress toward wide-scale adoption of electricity restructuring is, therefore, likely to resume.In the face of that eventuality, citizens, environmentalists, energy producers, and policymakerswant to understand how greater competition in electricity markets is likely to affect emissions from the electricity sector and, ultimately, environmental quality.

     Does open access to transmission increase use of older, higher-polluting coal-fired facilitiesin the Midwest and consequently increase emissions? Might the long-range transport of suchemissions compromise the ability of eastern states to comply with the Clean Air Act’s ozonestandard? What would become of utility programs that promote demand-side management andthe use of renewable energy sources? And if restructuring delivered the promised lower pricesfor electricity, would increased demand lead to higher emissions?

      Restructuring could result in substantial changes in the mix of generation technologies employedto produce electricity, the efficiency of power plant operations, and the price and quantityof electricity traded in the marketplace—each of which can affect emissions.

      This study looks at the effects of restructuring on air emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx)and carbon dioxide (CO2).2 It addresses the expected impacts of restructuring under alternativeair emissions regulations. It does not attempt to measure the impacts of the industry restructuringthat have occurred to date. As of early 2001, about one-third of the United States had introducedretail access, and this partial restructuring forms the baseline for our study. We seekto estimate impacts on air emissions of moving to full retail access—nationwide restructuring.

       For NOx emissions, the baseline for this study is the summer season, cap-and-trade programfor the Northeast ozone transport region (OTR). The study compares this baseline withtwo alternative and more extensive NOx regulatory regimes. The first alternative expands theNortheast OTR program to a much wider geographic area—the eastern half of the UnitedStates. The second alternative extends the cap-and-trade program for the eastern United Statesfrom summer only to year-round. For CO2 emissions, the study baseline is today’s current policyof no regulation, and the two alternative policies are a $25-per-metric-ton and a $75-permetric-toncarbon tax. We conducted a series of large-scale simulation analyses incorporating the three NOx regulatory scenarios, plus one NOx scenario with and without the two levels ofcarbon taxes.

      The study simulates the operation of the electric power industry for the year 2008. The modelingprovides geographic detail at the level of 13 subregions (see note to Figure A) of the NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and estimates generation output (by fuel type),capacity mix, electricity prices, and air emissions. In addition, the modeling estimates the costsof complying with air emissions control regulations.